What is Positivism Today? by Garcia-Salmones Rovira, Monica
SYMPOSIUM ON PROSPER WEIL, “TOWARDS RELATIVE NORMATIVITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW?”
WHAT IS POSITIVISM TODAY?
Mónica García-Salmones Rovira*
This essay focuses on the understanding of positivism in Prosper Weil’s time, its trajectory since, and how that
trajectory reflects changes that have occurred in global society in the intervening years. The world to which Weil
spoke is neither in scientific nor in political and cultural terms the same as ours. Key positivist notions, such as
neutrality or Weil’s critique of the ideal of the unity of the international community and of the invocation of higher
moral values, appear to chain sound normative principles while letting loose real power. At any rate, Weil’s ideas
have not survived globalization or the critical and historical turn taken in the discipline of international law. And yet
“Towards Relative Normativity?” arguably owes its lasting significance to its grasp of the weight of the authority of
law in international society.
It Was Never Neutral
“Towards Relative Normativity?” is a classic, and surprisingly modern in certain respects. But it is undeniable
that the school of positivism to which Prosper Weil belonged has lost much of its once absolute authority in the
discipline.1 To mention one of several non-positivist studies on normativity, Karl-Heinz Ladeur’s political analysis
that a court charged with achieving a stable order will, ostensibly, be less flexible than (international) actors who
pursue a particular right goes further towards explaining the volatility of today’s international legal order than does
Weil’s abstract attack against relative normativity.2 The current dynamic of international law, involving numerous
international courts, organizations, and actors who not only interpret but also constantly develop law, is incom-
mensurable with Weil’s type of self-conscious and cognitive-static international positivism.
Moreover, the phenomenon of relative normativity is not new. Matthias Goldmann studies the way in which
over centuries different expressions of relative normativity, such as ius cogens, obligations erga omnes, and myriad
types of soft law, have been articulated; he concludes that “throughout the history of modern international law
relative normativity has been the rule rather than the exception.”3 In this constellation, Weil’s piece vindicating
spotless normativity appears almost like a unicorn offering an improbable remedy against the poisonous
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power of politics.4 It is likely that this has been one of its main charms during the last decades. But whether “as a
conceptual uni-verse” or as “an unrelated pluri-verse,” international lawyers no longer seem able to prevent engage-
ment with one or another form of global legal thought, including the political, cultural, and sociological principles
sustaining them.5 Pure normativity does not seem to penetrate far enough and, to paraphrase Lassa Oppenheim,
the late twentieth century positivism articulated in “Towards Relative Normativity?” belongs in a museum, where
the tools used to do science in the past are preserved.6
This is especially the case for Weil’s understanding of neutrality, which has parted company with any scientific
connotations that it might once have possessed. The French lawyer noted that “[b]oth religious and ideological
neutrality are inherent in the basic concept of international law.”7 Themost superficial historical perspectivemakes
this statement quite revealing of the presentism of Weil’s text. In the very complex intellectual history of the twen-
tieth century, neutrality was—for a short period before the end of the Cold War—the new ideology of a group of
well-positioned international lawyers. Arguably, this was roughly during the period when Kelsen’s “pure theory”
had been internalized by a sufficient number of international lawyers, most but not all of whom were Europeans,
and the existential perils of the Second World War and the Cold War seemed far enough away.8 Weil, an admin-
istrative lawyer by training and practice (with expertise also in investment law and the law of the sea), surely felt
comfortable with this separation of law and politics. Nevertheless, he was also aware of the difficulty involved in
maintaining the happy equilibrium of neutrality. A former president of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal,
he stated that “the judge reviews merely the legality (légalité ) of a decision and not its wisdom (opportunité ). The
difficulty for all administrative tribunals is to draw such lines.”9 The correct standpoint of an administrative judge
was to remain apolitical, and in a similar way the natural standpoint of international law, as expressed in “Towards
Relative Normativity?,” was to be neutral.
Normativity was at once the result of voluntarism and the expression of the neutral character of international
law: “Without this positivistic approach, the neutrality so essential to international law qua coordinator between
equal, but disparate, entities would remain in continual jeopardy.”10 However, this sort of argument about the
neutrality of international law has always been problematic. What in theory seems quite plausible and almost com-
monsensical—that if all countries agree on a norm of international law, then that norm is neutral—fails to stand up
to close critical scrutiny. There seems rather to exist an opposition between the attributes “consensual” and “neu-
tral.”Either the norms of international law are consensual—andWeil hoped tomaintain them as such—and hence
result from certain power and epistemological struggles and structures; or, alternatively, they are neutral. But how
can they be simultaneously consensual and neutral? Moreover, is it possible in a society of moral human beings to
have neutral norms?Would that even be a good thing? One might rejoice at the fact that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was not neutral and probably regret that theDeclaration of the Berlin Conference that prompted
4 Those who drank out of the horn of a unicorn were immune to poison and diseases such as epilepsy, as told by Cstias, the ancient
Persian historian. See ODELL SHEPARD, THE LORE OF THE UNICORN 26 (1930).
5 DAVID ROTH-ISIGKEIT, THE PLURALITY TRILEMMA: A GEOMETRY OF LEGAL THOUGHT 223 (2018).
6 Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AJIL 313 (1908).
7 Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AJIL 413, 420 (1983).
8 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967).
9 Prosper Weil, Questions Conclusives, in PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE WORLD BANK ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 193 (Nassib G. Ziadé ed., 2008).
10 Weil, supra note 7, at 421.
88 AJIL UNBOUND Vol. 114
the Scramble for Africa did not provide a neutral outcome in ethical terms.11 Quite frankly, no one either back then
or now would claim that these declarations were neutral, even if consensual. In addition to this reasoning, several
waves of critical legal thinking that now form part of the mainstream have rendered untenable any claim that inter-
national law is neutral.
Furthermore, Weil’s purported ideal of religious and ideological neutrality unrealistically depicted an unlimited
number of moral and religious conceptions of society relative to which international law would appear to establish
a neutral benchmark. Nowadays, the possible moral conceptions involved in building a peaceful, just, and sustain-
able international order seem anything but limitless. The most pressing issue in current international law may be
mentioned here as an example: environmental degradation. Far from there being infinite alternatives, natural sci-
entists argue that the viable moral and political choices can be counted on the fingers of one hand. In a minimalist
mood, the choice for a society to be adopted through international law today might be between whether we con-
tinue to legitimize, through law and its enshrined rights, the double standard of indiscriminately seeking unlimited
wealth and seeking a principle of fundamental political and material equality, or whether we decide substantively on
one over the other. In practice, the latter does not mean a sort of utopian communism, whatever its virtues, but
taking seriously the principle that the international arena is a political space with the concomitant limitations that
adhere to it.
Another example, taken this time from investment law, may help to clarify this idea of the political space. Much
has been written lately on the shortcomings of the current investment law system. Some proposals advocate a new
design for investor protection that would entail granting investors both rights and corresponding responsibilities.
In a similar way to participants in any political commonwealth, investors would see their property rights protected
and would also be responsible for their ownmisconduct.12 The debate is taking place and the choices are open, but
they are not infinite. In a sense, accepting a limited scope to make decisions on the basis of politics as to which
actions are better for all is a sign of the maturity of the discipline of international law.
More generally, it seems implausible now to think of international law as a neutral conductor akin to a well-
functioning electrical circuit. The principle of the neutrality of method, rooted in natural sciences, was long ago
abandoned in the sphere of the social sciences.13 And even in terms of religion, many have lost faith in the secular,
as David Kennedy wrote provocatively some years ago.14
The International Community Is Finally Here
Weil’s warning against those “seeking to create today the law of tomorrow’s international society” and against
actors who try to instill in “today’s international society the concepts appropriate to a different society” proved that
he was not such a committed Kelsenian after all.15 Kelsen, to be sure, was a political realist, but if Weil were com-
mitted to the pure theory type of normativity, he would not have shied away from transferring into international
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, UNGAOR, 3d Sess., UNDoc. A/810 (1948); General Act of the Conference
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law an ideal of the administrative world that he knew well: centralization. Instead, in 1983, Weil considered with
great caution the “aspiration of greater unity” and the “will to transcend the traditional international society,”
which was one of “juxtaposed egoisms.”16
Forty years later, that “greater unity” that Weil feared would be pressed on the rest by some naïve or interested
international actors has arrived. There is no need to relate here all of the historical events and to describe the
intensity of communication and technology, which international law has done much to regulate and promote
and which has made the world small. Moreover, the closeness of the countries and peoples of the world has
not prevented the “juxtaposed egoisms” mentioned by Weil, and we observe how those “juxtaposed egoisms”
continue to thrive by old and new means. If anything, we have nostalgia for the wish to “forge an international
community for the common good,” which is something, incidentally, that Weil did not criticize but chose to ana-
lyze with sobriety and critical distance.17
However, his trepidation in the face of “greater unity” makes one wonder whether he was targeting the right
culprit. The theoretical problematization in “Towards Relative Normativity?” of whether the international com-
munity does or does not have a personality seems terribly irrelevant today, and the doubts about “who or what is
this community?” speak of another era. On the contrary, what now feels difficult, even sometimes burdensome, is
the impossibility of evading the reality that the international community exists, and the potential responsibility
towards it: consider Lampedusa, the Mexican border, the Antarctic, the “failed states” and their populations.
Peoples living, respectively, in materially deprived conditions and in conditions of materialism stare at each
other in puzzlement—not, arguably, with hostility, but certainly not with indifference. We are acutely aware of
the fact that some of us travel abroad at least once a month while others starve, and that young people in
many places go to school, study at a university, and find a job, while in many others they cannot do any of
those things. Statistics concerning broken families, unemployment and overemployment, high suicide rates,
and the loneliness of old people and of children stand as evidence that so-called developed countries also have
their share of problems.
The Praxis of Politics
Moreover, it has been a long time since the once powerful image of two ideologies—the neutrality of positivism
and the idealism of natural law—slugging it out matched perceptions of what is important in international law.
Nowadays this conflict appears reductive of the real issues at stake, and more a remnant of a Eurocentric problem-
atique than an insightful theme.
It is also worth noting that the turn towards history in international law has contributed to the education of the
regular international lawyer, who now analyzes the complexity of legal phenomena and theories such as positivism
and natural law more critically. History is no longer purely the territory of erudite jurists. Studies of natural law
taking a wide historical perspective now show howmany radically different forms of natural law exist. Before it was
introduced into a ius gentium that became increasingly idealist, the core of natural law was about being just. Natural
law was praxis and thus action resulting from practical reasoning.18 It amounted to one of the expressions of God
in the world—the good human being—and not to idealistic principles. The desire to rationally monitor the content
of natural law in order to adapt it to the different political objectives of kings, princes, nations, and empires took
shape in the writings of the early fathers of international law, Hugo Grotius and possibly Francisco de Vitoria
16 Weil, supra note 7, at 422.
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before him, and remained an influential theme for several centuries after that.19 Thus began the paradoxical path
of natural law being posited by the natural international lawyers. The positivist critique of natural law in the late
nineteenth and twentieth century was accordingly devastating, and not altogether unjustly so.
Strikingly, however merciless the ideological struggle had been, much of the critique directed against natural law
of any kind from the perspective of scientific and economic positivismmelted awaywhen confronted with outright
injustice. One of my favorite Hans Kelsen quotations, for what it reveals of his complexity, is to be found in an
article in which he discusses the retroactivity of the law of the Nuremberg trials:
Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established individual criminal
responsibility were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the persons who committed these acts
were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be
considered as absolutely incompatible with justice. Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of
the fact that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts made pun-
ishable with retroactive force.20
After decades of political struggle for scientism and against ideology, Kelsen seemed to come to terms with the
fact that positive law was not by itself enough to address the challenges thrown up in the international order.
Perhaps due to a certain law of the evolution of sciences roughly to the effect that every necessary stage requires
testing, the principles put forward in Weil’s piece were impervious to Kelsen’s insight. Thus in 1983 Weil would
regret that “normativity is becoming a question of ‘more or less,’” referring to norms of jus cogens and international
crimes. In this manner, the idea of pure normativity had arrived in international law, too. As we have seen, its reign
would not be long.
Positivism has since become moral, social, and political. H.L.A. Hart had already done the difficult work of
opening up positivist reasoning to accommodate moral values and principles.21 Lately, the value of excellence
in interpretation and subsequent persuasion of legal positivism has been explained on the grounds of what I under-
stand to be akin to truth statements about reality.22 Even Weil’s very plea for preserving the normativity of inter-
national law seems to match one of the fundamental principles of a political constitution: that it instils and
maintains a sense of reverence in the (global) population.23 On the other hand, inspired by the twentieth century
natural law theoretician Lon L. Fuller, social constructivists such as Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope refer to
“the practice of legality” in an attempt to ground the authority of law on the social substance of shared and agreed
understandings beneath its formal sources.24 In our small globe, would Thomas Aquinas, Hans Kelsen, or Prosper
Weil regard themselves as natural or positivist international lawyers? Or neither?
19 This argument is made in Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Impasse of Human Rights: A Note on Human Rights, Natural Rights and
Continuities in International Law, 21 J. HIST. INT’L L. 518 (2019).
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